Search for: All records

A wealth of evidence indicates that children use their developing linguistic knowledge to incrementally interpret speech and predict upcoming reference to objects. For verbs, determiners, case-markers, and adjectives, hearing linguistic information that sufficiently constrains referent choice leads to anticipatory eye-movements. There is, however, limited evidence about whether children also use spatial prepositions predictively. This is surprising and theoretically important: spatial prepositions provide abstract semantic information that must interface with spatial properties of, and relations between, objects in the world. Making this connection may develop late because of the complex mapping required. In a visual-world eye-tracking task, we find that adults and 4-year-olds hearing 'inside' (but not 'near') look predictively to objects that afford the property of containment. We conclude that children make predictions about the geometric properties of objects from spatial terms that specify these properties, suggesting real-time use of language to guide analysis of objects in the visual world. 

Symmetry is ubiquitous in nature, in logic and mathematics, and in perception, language, and thought. Although humans are exquisitely sensitive to visual symmetry (e.g., of a butterfly), symmetry in natural language goes beyond visuospatial properties: many words point to abstract concepts with symmetrical content (e.g., equal, marry). For example, if Mark marries Bill, then Bill marries Mark. In both cases (vision and language), symmetry may be formally characterized as invariance under transformation. Is this a coincidence, or is there some deeper psychological resemblance? Here we asked whether representations of symmetry correspond across language and vision. To do so, we developed a novel cross-modal matching paradigm. On each trial, participants observed a visual stimulus (either symmetrical or nonsymmetrical) and had to choose between a symmetrical and nonsymmetrical English predicate unrelated to the stimulus (e.g., “negotiate” vs. “propose”). In a first study with visual events (symmetrical collision or asymmetrical launch), participants reliably chose the predicate matching the event’s symmetry. A second study showed that this “language-vision correspondence” generalized to objects and was weakened when the stimuli’s binary nature was made less apparent (i.e., for one object, rather than two inward-facing objects). A final study showed the same effect when nonsigners guessed English translations of signs from American Sign Language, which expresses many symmetrical concepts spatially. Taken together, our findings support the existence of an abstract representation of symmetry which humans access via both perceptual and linguistic means. More broadly, this work sheds light on the rich, structured nature of the language-cognition interface. 

Symmetry is ubiquitous in nature, in logic and mathematics, and in perception, language, and thought. Although humans are exquisitely sensitive to visual symmetry (e.g., of a butterfly), symmetry in natural language goes beyond visuospatial properties: many words point to abstract concepts with symmetrical content (e.g., equal, marry). For example, if Mark marries Bill, then Bill marries Mark. In both cases (vision and language), symmetry may be formally characterized as invariance under transformation. Is this a coincidence, or is there some deeper psychological resemblance? Here we asked whether representations of symmetry correspond across language and vision. To do so, we developed a novel cross-modal matching paradigm. On each trial, participants observed a visual stimulus (either symmetrical or non-symmetrical) and had to choose between a symmetrical and non-symmetrical English predicate unrelated to the stimulus (e.g., “negotiate” vs. “propose”). In a first study with visual events (symmetrical collision or asymmetrical launch), participants reliably chose the predicate matching the event’s symmetry. A second study showed that this “language-vision correspondence” generalized to objects, and was weakened when the stimuli’s binary nature was made less apparent (i.e., for one object, rather than two inward-facing objects). A final study showed the same effect when nonsigners guessed English translations of signs from American Sign Language, which expresses many symmetrical concepts spatially. Taken together, our findings support the existence of an abstract representation of symmetry which humans access via both perceptual and linguistic means. More broadly, this work sheds light on the rich, structured nature of the language-cognition interface. 

Symmetry is ubiquitous in nature, in logic and mathematics, and in perception, language, and thought. Although humans are exquisitely sensitive to visual symmetry (e.g., of a butterfly), linguistic symmetry goes far beyond visuospatial properties: Many words refer to abstract, logically symmetrical concepts (e.g., equal, marry). This raises a question: Do representations of symmetry correspond across language and vision, and if so, how? To address this question, we used a cross-modal matching paradigm. On each trial, adult participants observed a visual stimulus (either symmetrical or non-symmetrical) and had to choose between a symmetrical and non-symmetrical English predicate unrelated to the stimulus (e.g., "negotiate" vs. "propose"). In a first study with visual events (symmetrical collision or asymmetrical launch), participants reliably chose the predicate matching the event's symmetry. A second study showed that this "matching" generalized to static objects, and was weakened when the stimuli's binary-relational nature was made less apparent (i.e., one object with a symmetrical contour, rather than two symmetrically configured objects). Taken together, our findings support the existence of an abstract relational concept of symmetry which humans access via both perceptual and linguistic means. More broadly, this work sheds light on the rich, structured nature of the language-cognition interface, and points towards a possible avenue for acquisition of word-to-world mappings for the seemingly inaccessible logical symmetry of linguistic terms. 

Symmetry is ubiquitous in nature, in logic and mathematics, and in perception, language, and thought. Although humans are exquisitely sensitive to visual symmetry (e.g., of a butterfly), linguistic symmetry goes far beyond visuospatial properties: Many words refer to abstract, logically symmetrical concepts (e.g., equal, marry). This raises a question: Do representations of symmetry correspond across language and vision, and if so, how? To address this question, we used a cross-modal matching paradigm. On each trial, adult participants observed a visual stimulus (either symmetrical or non-symmetrical) and had to choose between a symmetrical and non-symmetrical English predicate unrelated to the stimulus (e.g., "negotiate" vs. "propose"). In a first study with visual events (symmetrical collision or asymmetrical launch), participants reliably chose the predicate matching the event's symmetry. A second study showed that this "matching" generalized to static objects, and was weakened when the stimuli's binary-relational nature was made less apparent (i.e., one object with a symmetrical contour, rather than two symmetrically configured objects). Taken together, our findings support the existence of an abstract relational concept of symmetry which humans access via both perceptual and linguistic means. More broadly, this work sheds light on the rich, structured nature of the language-cognition interface, and points towards a possible avenue for acquisition of word-to-world mappings for the seemingly inaccessible logical symmetry of linguistic terms. 

AbstractIn language, speakers are more likely to mention the goals, or endpoints, of motion events than they are to mention sources, or starting points (e.g. Lakusta & Landau, 2005). This phenomenon has been explained in cognitive terms, but may also be affected by discourse-communicative factors: For participants in prior work, sources can be characterized as given, already-known information, while goals are new, relevant information to communicate. We investigate to what extent the goal bias in language (and memory) is affected when the source is or is not in common ground between speaker and hearer, and thus whether it is discourse-given or -new. We find that the goal bias in language is severely diminished when source and goal are discourse-new. We suggest that the goal bias in language can be attributed to discourse-communicative factors in addition to any cognitive goal bias. Discourse factors cannot fully account for the bias in memory.